Alaska v. Arnariak: Should Alaskan Land Use Regulations Protecting A Wildlife Sanctuary Be Preempted By The Marine Mammal Protection Act? by Therriault, Michael E.
Ocean and Coastal Law Journal
Volume 5 | Number 1 Article 7
2000
Alaska v. Arnariak: Should Alaskan Land Use
Regulations Protecting A Wildlife Sanctuary Be
Preempted By The Marine Mammal Protection
Act?
Michael E. Therriault
University of Maine School of Law
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.mainelaw.maine.edu/oclj
This Case Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at University of Maine School of Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted
for inclusion in Ocean and Coastal Law Journal by an authorized administrator of University of Maine School of Law Digital Commons. For more
information, please contact mdecrow@maine.edu.
Recommended Citation
Michael E. Therriault, Alaska v. Arnariak: Should Alaskan Land Use Regulations Protecting A Wildlife Sanctuary Be Preempted By The
Marine Mammal Protection Act?, 5 Ocean & Coastal L.J. (2000).
Available at: http://digitalcommons.mainelaw.maine.edu/oclj/vol5/iss1/7
ALASKA v. ARNARIAK:
SHOULD ALASKAN LAND USE REGULATIONS
PROTECTING A WILDLIFE SANCTUARY
BE PREEMPTED BY THE
MARINE MAMMAL PROTECTION ACT?
Michael E. Therriault
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1972, Congress enacted the Marine Mammal Protection Act
(MMA),' establishing a national program to protect and conserve marine
mammals and their habitats. Promulgation of the MMPA was spurred by a
recognition that "man's impactupon marine mammals has ranged from what
might be termed malign neglect to virtual genocide."2 In essence, the
MMPA was designed to prohibit the "harassing, catching and killing of
marine mammals by U.S. citizens or within the jurisdiction of the United
States,"3 including those mammals which are "physiologically adapted to the
oceans." The MMPA is based on the premise that marine mammals are of
"great international significance, esthetic and recreational as well as eco-
nomic."5
* University of Maine School of Law, Class of 2000.
1. Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1361-1421(h) (1994).
2. H.R. REP. No. 92-707, at 2 (1971), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4144..
3. Id. Congress stated in full that "[tihe purpose of this legislation is to prohibit the
harassing, catching and killing of marine mammals by U.S. citizens or within the jurisdiction
of the United States, unless taken under the authority of a permit issued by an agency of the
Executive Branch." Id.
4. Id. at 27.
5. Id. at 26. The House Report declared in the section-by-section analysis that:
(5) This subsection states that Congress has a legitimate interest in acting in this area
since the animals are highly significant to interstate commerce. (6) This subsection
states that marine mammals are resources of great significance and that it is congres-
sional policy that they should be protected and encouraged to develop consistent with
the sound policies ofresource management. The primary objective of this management
must be to maintain the health and stability of the marine ecosystem; this in turn
indicates that the animals must be managed for their benefit and not for the benefit of
commercial exploitation.
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Enforcement responsibilities are allocated to the U.S. Department of
Commerce and U.S. Department of Interior.6
Although the MMPA has been amended several times, it has consistently
provided a blueprint for marine mammal conservation and habitat aware-
ness.7 Recently, a number of decisions have raised issues of federalism,
specifically the purposes and goals of a Federal Act versus recognized states'
rights to enact conservation measures. 8 State conservation methods concern-
ing marine mammals protected under the MMPA are prohibited by an
explicit preemption clause in the enabling legislation. This preemption
arguably precludes a local interest in the protection of marine mammals.9
In State of Alaska v. Arnariak,0 the Supreme Court of Alaska con-
fronted the issue of whether or not the MMPA preempted state regulations
prohibiting entry without a permit and the discharge of firearms on state
lands." The court held that the legislative history and purpose of the
MMPA, combined with the canon that statutes should be interpreted to avoid
unconstitutional results, indicated that the "MMPA's preemption clause is
not so broad as to prevent the state from limiting access to, or the discharge
of firearms on, state wildlife refuges."' 2
This Casenote suggests that two problems result from this decision. The
first lies in the court's inherent disregard of the overarching history,
purposes, and goals of the MMPA. The second, a correlation of the first,
6. See 16 U.S.C § 1362 (12)(A)(i) & (ii). The Secretary of Commerce is responsible for
for marine mammals of the order of Cetacea and Pinnipedia, except for the walrus; the
Secretary of Interior is responsible for all other marine mammals. Id.
7. See Nina M. Young & Suzanne Iudicello, Blueprint For Whale Conservation:
Implementing theMarine MammalProtection Act, 3 OCEAN& COASTALL.J. 149, 151 (1997)
(citing Natasha Atkins, Summary of National Laws and International Agreements Affecting
River Dolphins, in BIOLOGY AND CONSERVATION OF THE RIVER DOLPHINS; 3 Occasional
Papers of the IUCN Species Survival Commission (SSC) 168, 173 (1987)).
8. See Intertanko v. Locke, 148 F.3d 1053, 1066 (9th Cir.1998), cert. granted, 120 S. Ct.
33 (1999) (certain regulations concerning the prevention ofoil spills are preempted by federal
legislation because such regulations qualify as "design and construction requirements");
Vietnamese Fisheries Ass'n v. California Dep't of Fish & Game, 816 F. Supp. 1468 (N.D.
Cal. 1993) (holding that enforcement of a California ban on gillnetting for rockfish was
preempted by federal groundfish regulations allowing gillnetting in those waters).
9. See 16 U.S.C. § 1379(a). The MMPA states in pertinent part:
No State may enforce, or attempt to enforce, any State law or regulation relating to the
taking of species (which term for purposes of this section includes any population
stock) of marine mammal within the State unless the Secretary has transferred authority
for the conservation and management of that species ... to the State under subsection
(b) (1) of this section.
10. 941 P.2d 154 (Alaska 1997).
11. See id. at 157.
12. Id. at 158.
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arises in recognition that although local legitimate interests may provide
valuable insights into issues of marine mammal conservation and habitat
protection when associated with the goals and purposes of the MIPA, the
issues must be evaluated under the M1MPA "umbrella." In embracing state
rights over federal preemption, the court failed to find a "middle road" where
the interests of the State in protecting its Fifth Amendment right could
coexist with the general purposes of the MIVIPA.
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND OF THE CASE
A. Marine Mammal Protection Act
The Marine Mammal Protection Act embodies a concerted legislative
effort to curtail "commercial exploitation" of marine mammals and their
habitats. 3 The need for such legislation stemmed from "man's impact upon
marine mammals," and the desire to protect "resources of great international
significance."' 4 Specifically, the MMPA forbids any person subject to U.S.
jurisdiction from taking, harassing, or killing marine mammals. 5 The
species protected by the MMPA include "mammals which are physiologi-
cally adapted to the oceans," such as manatees, whales, dolphins, seals, and
walruses.' 6 The Secretary of Commerce is responsible for all cetaceans and
pinnipeds, while the Secretary of Interior is responsible for all other marine
mammals, including the walrus. 7
In protecting these species, the IMIPA sets out two specific goals. First,
Congress determined that marine mammals "should be protected and
encouraged to develop to the greatest extent feasible commensurate with
sound policies of resource management."' 8 Second, and perhaps more
encompassing, Congress desired to "maintain the health and stability of the
marine ecosystem."' 9
Further, Congress also found a legitimate interest in acting in this area
because the animals are highly significant to interstate commerce. 20 Thus,
13. H.R. Rap. No. 92-707, at 25 (1971), reprinted in U.S.C.C.A.N. 4144, 4154.
14. Id. at 2, 3.
15. Marine Mammal Protection Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1371 (1994).
16. Id. § 1362(6).
17. See id. § 1362(A)(i) & (ii).
18. Id. § 1361(6).
19. Id.
20. See id. See also id. § 1361(5)(A) & (B). This section states:
(5) marine mammals and marine mammal products either - (A) move interstate
commerce, or (B) affect the balance of marine ecosystems in a manner which is
important to other animals and animal products which move in interstate commerce,
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it expressly preempted "takings" of marine mammals, by stating that "no
State may enforce, or attempt to enforce, any State law or regulation relating
to the taking of any.., species of marine mammal within the State.. .,2.
Only with the proper transference of authority from the Secretary to the state
may state laws be enacted and maintained.22 The MMPA exempts Alaskan
natives from these particular provisions, but only if "takings" are perform-
ed under certain conditions.23
B. Alaska State Laws and Regulations
In 1960, Alaska established the Walrus Islands State Game Sanctuary to
preserve the "sole remaining place in the state where walruses annually haul
out on land."24  Round Island, part of the Walrus Islands State Game
Sanctuary, is subject to several regulations of the Alaska Administrative
Code.25 Specifically, only those who hold a state-issued permit may enter
and that the protection and conservation of marine mammals and their habitats in
therefore necessary to insure the continuing availability of those products which move
in interstate commerce.
21. See 16 U.S.C. § 1379(a).
22. See id.
23. Id. § 137 1(b). These conditions for Alaskan natives include:
Except as provided in section 109 [16 U.S.C. § 1379], the provisions of this Chapter
shall not apply with respect to the taking of any marine mammal by any Indian, Aleut,
or Eskimo who resides in Alaska and who dwells on the coast of the North Pacific
Ocean of the Arctic Ocean if such a taking - (1) is for subsistence purposes; or (2)
is done for purposes of creating and selling authentic native articles of handicrafts and
clothing... ; and (3) in each case, is not accomplished in a wasteful manner.
24. ALASKA STAT. § 16.20.092 (Michie 1998). The legislative findings and purposes of
the Walrus Island State Game Sanctuary are as follows:
(a) The legislature recognizes that (1) the Walrus Islands are the sole remaining place
in the state where walruses annually haul out on land and all similar "hauling grounds"
in the state which were formerly utilized have been abandoned by walruses due to
excessive molestation and slaughter; (2) the Walrus Islands are uninhabited, and the
walruses frequenting them are not required by the state for subsistence utilization; (3)
the Walrus Islands have great importance as a retreat for the Pacific walrus from the
standpoints of conservation, scientific value, and tourist interest; (4) the Department
of Natural Resources has taken appropriate action to achieve transfer of title in the
Walrus Islands to the state. (b) The purpose of AS 16.20.090 - 16.20.098 is to protect
the walruses and other game on the Walrus Islands.
25. See ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 5, § 92.066 (1998). The Code states in pertinent part:
(2)(A) camping is allowed only in the designated camping area; (B) visitors shall
remove all personal gear and garbage upon departure from the sanctuary; (C) pets are
prohibited on Round Island; (D) discharge of firearms, disturbance or harassment of
wildlife, removal of wildlife or parts of wildlife, swimming, and recreational diving are
all prohibited on Round Island and in adjacent waters within three miles of Round
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the island. Permit holders must abide by several rules, including the
prohibition of the "discharge of firearms, disturbance or harassment of
wildlife, removal of wildlife or parts of wildlife.. ." on Round Island.26
These state regulations do not contain an exemption for Alaskan natives to
take marine mammals.
C. Associated Law
At issue in Arnariak was the preemption of state law and regulations by
the MMPA. Preemption analysis involves a comparison of the plain
language of the statute with the preemption clause, and a review of its
legislative history.27 Three kinds of preemption exist: field, conflict, and
express.2' This case involves express preemption.29 Specifically, the United
States Supreme Court has interpreted the clause "relating to" in the M [PA
as expressing broad preemptive purpose.3' The Supreme Court, however,
recognizes a limit to the reach of such clauses.3'
Under the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, no taking
of private property can occur without just compensation.32 State property is
Island; (E) unless authorized in writing by sanctuary staff, access to all beaches and
adjacent waters is prohibited except during arrival and departure at Boat Cove;
authorization for beach and water access may be granted for scientific or educational
activities and that access requires the presence of sanctuary staff.
26. ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 5, § 92.066(2)(D) (1998).
27. See, e.g., Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504,516 (1992); Rice v. Santa
Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 229-30 (1947) ("The question in each case is what the
purpose of Congress was."); Warren Trading Post Co. v. Arizona State Tax Commission, 380
U.S. 685 (1965).
28. See Cipollone v. Liggett, 505 U.S. at 516.
29. See CSX Transp., Inc. v. Easterwood, 507 U.S. 658 (1993) (explaining that if a
federal statute contains an express preemption clause, the task of statutory construction will
first focus on the plain wording of the clause); Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S.
133, 138 (1990) ("Where ... Congress has expressly included a broadly worded pre-emption
provision in a comprehensive statute ... [the] task of discerning congressional intent is
considerably simplified."); FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 498 U.S. 52, 56-57 (1990) (Federal
preemption of state laws "may be either express or implied, and... is explicitly stated in the
statute's language or implicitly contained in its structure and purpose.").
30. See Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374,383(1992); Pilot Life Ins.
Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41,47 (1987); see also American Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens, 513 U.S.
219 (1995).
31. See Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133,139(1990) ("Notwithstanding
its breadth, we have recognized limits to ERISA's preemption clause.")
32. See U.S. CONST. amend. V. "[N]or shall private property be taken for public use
without just compensation."
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included in the Fifth Amendment protections.33 Therefore, a governmental
attempt to require public access to private property by implementation of the
Federal Act over state laws and regulations is as unconstitutional as a
"permanent physical occupation"34 or a violation of the "universal right to
exclude.
3 5
III. STATE OF ALASKA V. ARNARIAK
A. Background
Adam and Marie Amariak, Alaskan natives, entered Round Island on
June 21, 1993.36 They did not have the required permits to enter the island.37
Adam fired a rifle at a walrus violating an Alaskan Administrative Code
regulation forbidding the discharge of firearms on the island.3"
The portion of the MMPA that prohibits the taking of marine mammals
instructs that "[n]o state may enforce, or attempt to enforce, any state law or
regulation relating to the taking of any species ... of marine mammal(s)
within the state .... ,,39 However, the MMPA exempts Alaskan natives who
take marine mammals under certain conditions.4"
The State filed a complaint against the Arnariaks; both were charged
with entering the island without a permit, and Adam was charged with
discharging a firearm on the island.4 The Arnariaks moved to dismiss,
arguing that the state regulations were preempted by the federal MMPA.42
The district court granted the motion to dismiss, and the court of appeals
33. See United States v. 50 Acres of Land, 469 U.S. 24, 31 (1984).
34. Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 832 (1987) (A permanent
physical occupation will be deemed to have occurred "where individuals are given a
permanent and continuous right to pass to and fro, so that the real property may continuously
be traversed, even though no particular individual is permitted to station himself permanently
upon the premises.").
35. Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 179 (1979) ("In this case, we hold the
'right to exclude,' so universally held to be a fundamental element of the property right, falls
within this category of interests that the Government cannot take without compensation.").
36. See Alaska v. Arnariak, 893 P.2d 1273, 1274 (Alaska Ct. App. 1995).
37. See id. See also ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 5, § 92.066 (1999).
38. See ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 5, § 92.066 (2)(D) (1992).
39. Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972, 16 U.S.C. § 1379(a) (1994).
40. See id. § 1371(b).
41. See Alaska v. Arnariak, 893 P.2d at 1274.
42. See Alaska v. Arnariak, 941 P.2d. 156 (Alaska 1997).
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affirmed.43 The State then petitioned the Alaska Supreme Court for a
hearing. The appeal was granted."
On appeal, the state argued that the MIVPA's prohibition against the
enforcement of the "'State law(s) on regulations relating to the taking of any
species.., of marine mammal within the State does not preclude the state
from enforcing [its Administrative Code Regulations] because that provision
is not a hunting regulation, but a 'land use regulation."'45 The State further
argued that interpreting the MMPA to preempt state regulation, which
protects other game as well as walruses, would render the MMPA unconsti-
tutional under the Fifth and Tenth Amendments of the United States
Constitution, and that the state regulations were intended to protect other
game, as well as walruses.4"
The Amariaks argued that native hunting does not interfere with species
preservation, and that the federal regulations meet the State's objectives.47
Further, the Amariaks argued that the state regulations were preempted by
the MMPA48 because the MMPA exempts certain Alaskan natives from state
prohibitions when they harvest marine mammals for certain purposes.49
B. The Court's Opinion
In holding that Alaska's regulations were not preempted by the MMPA,
the Alaska Supreme Court, following Nollan v. California Coastal Commi-
ssion,0 stated that a "governmental attempt to require public access to
private property is unconstitutional and invalid unless the government first
follows the condemnation process and pays just compensation."5' Citing a
line of "takings" cases, the court found that the application of section
1379(a) of the MMPA would be unconstitutional if it "were interpreted to
require the State to permit access to and discharge of firearms on Walrus
Island. 5
2
Furthermore, the court determined that the legislative history and
purpose of the MMPA did not support the assertion of any federal preemp-
43. See id.
44. See id.
45. Alaska v. A-nariak, 893 P.2d. at 1275.
46. See id. at 1276, 1277.
47. See Alaska v. Amariak, 941 P.2d at 160 (Robinowitz, J., concurring).
48. See id. at 156.
49. See Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972, 16 U.S.C. § 1371(b) (1994).
50. 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
51. Alaska v. Arnariak, 941 P.2d at 156.
52. Id. at 156,157.
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tion concerning a protected state sanctuary,53 and that the report of the
Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries of the House of Representa-
tives concerning the MMPA makes "clear that the act was not intended to
interfere with state sanctuaries which protect marine mammals. 54 The court
cited the "expressions of purpose" of the MMPA as sufficient to preclude
federal preemption in maintaining the walrus sanctuary.15  Given this
construction, the court reasoned that the phrase "relating to," although
suggesting a broad scale preemption, does not require application of the
preemption clause. 6 The court held that no federal preemption exists as
such a preemption would prevent the state from "limiting access to, or the
discharge of firearms on, state wildlife refuges," which would be equated to
a taking without just compensation.57
IV. DISCUSSION
Essentially, the court held that the MMPA did not preempt certain state
regulations involving walruses, and in particular, a walrus sanctuary, because
such a preemption is an unconstitutional taking without just compensation.58
Arnariak therefore supports state circumvention of important federal
directives in favor of local land use regulations. In reaching this conclusion,
the court determined the MMPA, despite an express preemption clause, did
not apply to state land use regulations.5 ' Two difficulties arise with this
decision. First, by finding that the MMPA did not extend to state regulation
of a state walrus sanctuary, the court arguably undermined the goals and
purposes of the MMPA, and opened the door to future denial of federal
preemption under the guise of state land use regulations. Second, the
decision provides a vivid example of how federalism conflicts are not easily
solved when federal and state laws clash.
53. See id.
54. Id. ("It is not the intention of this Committee to foreclose effective state programs
and protective measures such as sanctuaries .... ) (citing H.R. REP. No. 92-707, at 28
(1971).
55. Alaska v. Amariak, 941 P.2d reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.A.A.N. 4144, 4161:
In view of these expressions of purpose, it is difficult to believe that Congress also
intended a meaning which would preclude the State from continuing to maintain a
walrus sanctuary on state-owned islands which had previously been recognized as 'the
sole remaining place in the state where walruses annually haul out on land.'
56. Id. at 158.
57. Id.
58. See id.
59. See id.
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The MMPA and state regulations were enacted to protect certain marine
species and their habitats. Federal preemption of state regulations enables
the Arnariaks to "take" a marine mammal (in this case a walrus) for certain
defined purposes. The Round Island regulations, however, forbid such a
taking. Thus, any sort of analysis of this conflict involves consideration of
federal and local legislation. Because federal preemption of a state law is at
issue, analysis of this conflict involves a review of the Constitution, federal
and state legislation, federal preemption guidelines, and the specific intent
of Congress in enacting the MMPA.
The Constitution provides that the laws of the United States reign
supreme.' Certain issues may be considered more of a national rather than
local character, and federal law may preempt state law.6' The Supreme
Court has identified three types of preemption: field preemption, conflict
preemption, and express preemption. 2 Field preemption exists when federal
law so thoroughly occupies a legislative field "as to make reasonable the
inference that Congress left no room for the States to supplement it. '63 In the
instant case, it was noted that the regulation governing the taking of marine
mammals was in a "field [in] which the [MMPA] is intended to occupy."'c
Conflict preemption exists when state law "stands as an obstacle to the
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes of Congress."6 This
type of preemption is not at issue here, as Congress explicitly stated its intent
to displace state law in the statute's language, thus expressly preempting
state law.66
Section 1379(a) of the MMPA states that "[n]o state may enforce, or
attempt to enforce, any State law or regulation relating to the taking of any
60. See U.S. CONST. art. VI., cl. 2. "This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States
which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made,
under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land."
61. See CSX Transp., Inc. v. Easterwood, 507 U.S. 658, 663 (1993) ("Where a state
[law] conflicts with, or frustrates, federal law, the former must give way.").
62. See Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516 (1992).
63. Fidelity Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 153 (1982) (quoting
Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)).
64. Alaska v. Amariak, 941 P.2d at 159 (Robowitz, J., concurring).
65. California v. ARC America Corp., 490 U.S. 93, 100-01 (1989) (quoting Hines v.
Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)).
66. See Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 383 (1992):
For purposes of the present case, the key phrase, obviously, is 'relating to.' The
ordinary meaning of these words is a broad one - 'to stand in some relation; to have
bearing or concern; to pertain; refer, to bring into association with or connection with,'
Black's LawDictionary 1158 (5th ed. 1979)- and the words thus express a broadpre-
emptive purpose."
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species... of marine mammal[s] within the State.... 67 The Alaska statute
and regulations concern "walrus hauling grounds, 68 and include prohibiting
entry without a permit and the discharge of firearms.69 The court construed
the phrase "relating to" in section 1379(a) of the MMPA as meaning not "so
broad as to prevent the State from limiting access to, or the discharge of
firearms on, state wildlife refuges. 7 The court therefore found that section
1379(a) did not "preclude the state from restricting access to or from
prohibiting the discharge of firearms on the state land."' This interpretation,
though, is not supported by the legislative history or the purpose of the
MMPA.
72
It has been noted that Congressional purpose is the ultimate touchstone
of preemption analysis.73 Congress enacted the MMPA for several reasons,
not the least of which was to "prohibit the harassing, catching and killing of
marine animals. 74 Congress further clarified its purpose by stating that
marine mammals should be "protected and encouraged to develop to the
greatest extent feasible commensurate with sound policies of resource
management and that the primary objective of their management should be
to maintain the health and stability of the marine ecosystem., 75 In an attempt
to balance local interests with the protection of marine mammals, Congress
included a limited exception to the takings moratorium for Alaskan natives.76
67. Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972,16 U.S.C § 1379(a) (1994).
68. See ALASKA STAT. § 16.20.090 (Michie 1998).
69. See ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 5, §§ 92.066, 92.510(a)(13) (1999).
70. Alaska v. Arnariak, 941 P.2d 154, 158 (Alaska, 1997):
Here the legislative history, the purpose of the MMPA, and the rule that statutes should
be construed to avoid an unconstitutional result persuasively indicate that MMPA's
preemption is not so broad as to prevent the State from limiting access to, or the
discharge of firearms on, state wildlife refuges.
71. See id. at 158.
72. See H.R. REP. No. 92-707, at 2 (1971), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4144.
("The purpose of this legislation is to prohibit the harassing, catching and killing of marine
mammals by U.S. citizens or within the jurisdiction of the United States, unless taken under
the authority of a permit issued by an agency of the Executive Branch."); see also id. at 5:
H.R. 10420 takes the strong position that marine mammals and the marine ecosystems
upon which they depend for survival require additional protection from man's
activities. There can be no question of the constitutional power of the Congress to
regulate traffic in these animals and their products, deeply involved as they are in
interstate and foreign commerce.
73. See Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 229-30 (1947).
74. H.R. REP. No. 92-707, at 2 (1971), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4144.
75. Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972,16 U.S.C § 1361(6) (1994).
76. See H..R. REP. No. 92-707, at 39 (1971), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4144,
4168. Clarifying the exception for indigenous persons:
Sec. 107 (a) This section allows the taking by Indians, Aleuts, or Eskimos dwelling on
Alaska v. Arnariak
The Supreme Court recognizes that the inquiry into Congressional intent
may be simplified when Congress has included a broadly worded preemption
provision.77 The Supreme Court further recognizs that the phrase "relating
to" suggests a "broad scale preemption.,18 Therefore, section 1379(a) of the
MMPA may be reasonably interpreted as encompassing any law or
regulation involving walruses.
The legislative history of the MMPA supports this interpretation.
Clarification of section 109 of the Senate version reveals that, although a
proper transfer of authority to the state is possible, the "Secretary would not
in any case, however, thereby waive all subsequent Federal jurisdiction over
any such marine mammals. He must continue to monitor state programs to
make sure the purposes and policies of the Act continue to be fulfilled." 79
The Alaska Supreme Court, however, did not apply this interpretation, but
rather focused on the report of the Committee on Merchant Marine and
Fisheries of the House of Representatives concerning the MMPA to
conclude that Congress did not intend to foreclose state involvement in
maintaining sanctuaries.80 The difficulty in this interpretation is that further
exploration of the report clearly reveals Congressional intention to develop
the coast of the North Pacific Ocean or the Arctic Ocean, under certain circumstances.
These natives may not take marine mammals from endangered species, but they may
take marine mammals without permits if the taking is for subsistence purposes in
accordance with traditional customs, is not done wastefully, and is not done for
purposes of direct or indirect commercial sale. If a native kills a walrus for subsistence
purposes, the bill does not prohibit the use of ivory from that walrus' tusks so long as
his primary purpose for taking was that of subsistence. If, on the other hand, an
Eskimo wishes to take a number of walruses primarily for the purpose of selling their
tusks, he may not do so without a permit. (b) This subsection authorizes the Secretary,
in cases where he determines that species or stocks of marine mammals require
protection from native taking, to prescribe appropriate limitations on this taking. It was
recommended as an additional management tool by the State ofAlaska. Once the need
for such limitations has been removed, as for example, following the regrowth of a
depleted stock, the limitations must be removed.
Id. See also H.R. CONF. REP. No. 92-1448, at 11 (1972) (The House Bill preempted state
law, but allowed cooperative agreements with the States in harmony with the purposes of the
Act).
77. See Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133, 138 (1990) ('Where...
Congress has expressly included a broadly worded preemption provision in a comprehensive
statute... [the] task of discerning congressional intent is considerably simplified.")
78. Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 383 (1992).
79. H.R. REP. No. 92-1448, at 12 (1972).
80. See Alaska v. Amariak, 941 P.2d 154, 157 (Alaska 1997) ("The report of the
Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries of the House of Representatives concerning
the MMPA makes clear that the act was not intended to interfere with state sanctuaries which
protect marine mammals.").
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a cooperative relationship between federal and state agencies: "[T]he bill
permits and indeed requires the development of an extensive management
program in the agencies concerned, with full opportunity for cooperative
federal-state management programs designed to carry out the purposes and
policies of the [MMPA]." 8' Thus, the court inaccurately concluded that
Congress expressed no desire to "interfere" with state sanctuaries, because
Congress recognized a need to develop national standards concerning marine
mammals, and that a cooperative effort was conceivable.
In the spirit of this "cooperative effort," Congress provided specific
guidelines for the transfer of federal authority to state representative
agencies.8" Therefore, a state is not without recourse in determining the
livelihood of its local marine mammals and their habitats. State enforcement
of state laws or regulations is prohibited unless the federal government
transfers management authority to the state. 3 In this case, the federal
government did not transfer management authority for marine mammals to
the State of Alaska. 4 Even if Alaska had properly obtained management
authority from the federal government, it is important to note that the State
81. H.R. REP. No. 92-707, at 17 (1971), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4144, 415 1.
The bill states in pertinent part:
The bill permits and indeed requires the development of an extensive management
program in the agencies concerned, with full opportunity for cooperative federal-state
management programs designed to carry out the purposes and policies of the act. There
is no intention or desire within the Committee to remove any incentive from the states
to carry out necessary research or to protect animals residing within their jurisdictions
... The bill establishes reasonable protection for Alaskan natives taking marine
mammals for purposes of food or clothing, where the primary purpose is not
commercial sale. It couples this protection with adequate tools to allow the Secretaries
to prevent abuse of these privileges or to limit the taking in order to protect endangered
or depleted species or stocks.
See also id. at 13. Stating that:
U.S. knowledge and research programs devoted to the rest of the seals, including the
seal lions and the walruses, is tiny - as have been our efforts to control significantly
the activities of man affecting these animals. The management activities that have
taken place to date have been almost exclusively handled by the states. Many of these
state programs are soundly based, and should be encouraged. Other state management
programs involved the payment of bounties on marine mammals of various types.
There is, in brief, little semblance of any sort of integrated rational program for
management of all marine mammals within the United States; given the divided nature
of the regulatory structure which affects them, this is scarcely surprising.
82. Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972, 16 U.S.C. § 1379 (1994).
83. See id. § 1379(a).
84. See Alaska v. Amariak, 893 P.2d 1273, 1275 (Alaska Ct. App. 1995) ("The State of
Alaska has not maintained regulations containing a preference for rural subsistence hunting
of marine mammals, and the federal government has not transferred management authority
for marine mammals to the State of Alaska.").
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would still be obligated to implement a program" consistent with the
purposes, policies, and goals" of the MMPA." Because the MMPA
recognizes a need for national standards of conservation and care of species
and habitats, a transfer of management authority is never absolute.
In order for the MMPA to preempt Alaskan law, the particular law needs
to regulate the same subject matter as the MMPA.86 Alaskan legislative
findings concerning the Walrus Islands recognized the vital importance of
these islands to the survival and maintenance of the Pacific Walrus." The
Alaska legislature stated that the ultimate purpose of the statute was to
protect walruses and "other game" on the islands.88 This purpose supports
the Alaska Administrative Code's provision requiring an access permit and
forbidding the discharge of firearms. The regulations of the Code also use
terms specifically set out in the MMPA concerning the term "take." 9 Given
these factors, federal preemption of these regulations is permissible because
they "relate to" the taking of walruses, and therefore come within the subject
matter regulated by the MMPA.
The Supreme Court of Alaska concluded that a "governmental attempt
to require public access to private property is unconstitutional and invalid
unless the government first follows the condemnation process and pays just
compensation." 90 In making this determination, the court noted that imple-
mentation of the MMPA would "require" the State to allow access to
"private land" for Alaska natives to hunt marine mammals.9t Such a
requirement, the court stated, would constitute a "permanent physical
occupation."92 The United States Supreme Court has determined that a
"permanent physical occupation" occurs when individuals are given a
"permanent and continuous right to pass to and fro, so that the real property
may continuously be traversed."93 Ifa"permanent physical occupation" did
85. 16 U.S.C. § 1379(b)(1)(A).
86. See Alaska v. Amariak, 941 P.2d 154, 163 (Alaska, 1997) (Shortell, J. pro tem,
dissenting).
87. See id. at 163. ("The State correctlypoints out that 'shortly after statehood, Alaska's
Legislature created the sanctuary because it found that the Walrus Islands were the sole
remaining place in Alaska where walruses annually haul out on land."').
88. ALASKA STAT. § 16.20.090(4)(b) (Michie 1998) (The purpose of AS 16.20.090-
16.20.098 is to protect the walruses and other game on the Walrus Islands).
89. ALASKA ADMiN. CODE tit. 5, § 92.066(2)(D): (The "[d]ischarge of firearms,
disturbance or harassment of wildlife, removal ofwildlife orparts ofwildlife, swimming, and
recreational diving are all prohibited on Round Island and in adjacent waters within three
miles of Round Island.").
90. Alaska v. Amariak, 941 P.2d. at 156.
91. See id. at 157.
92. See id. at 156 (citing Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 438 U.S. 825 (1987)).
93. Nollan v. California, 483 U.S. 825, 831-32 (1987).
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result from federal preemption of state laws and regulations, it is clear that
an unconstitutional result would follow.
94
The court found that section 1379(a)'s federal preemption of the Alaskan
regulations was unconstitutional. Alternatively, another interpretation
finding federal preemption constitutional and justified may be more
applicable. 95 Specifically, section 1379(a) preempts the applicable Alaska
regulations affecting and controlling walruses.96 The MMPA was designed
to protect and preserve marine mammals and their habitats. As Congres-
sional action denotes, federal legislation ofan "interstate commerce" activity
necessarily involves the purpose of creating a national standard of that
activity to promote fairness and equity. Thus, MMPA preemption over these
Alaskan regulations could be construed as an affirmation of the national
standards that the MMPA embodies.
If federal preemption in this instance deals primarily with regulations
concerning the walrus, an unconstitutional result may not follow from its
implementation. Property owners all possess a common law right to prevent
trespass upon their land.97 The court determined that this right was infringed
upon and resulted in a taking without just compensation. However, if the
MMPA preempts only those regulations concerning walruses, it may not
follow that the State cannot enforce the common law right to prevent
trespass over its property - it is simply that the prosecution of a trespass
violation in this instance may not involve that specific common law right,
but rather encompass only activities relating to marine mammals." Thus, a
determination can be made that this potential federal preemption may not be
unconstitutional by asking whether the law or regulation itself, rather than
a reason for enforcing it, relates to walrus taking. 99
Implementing the presumption against finding federal preemption in
areas traditionally regulated by the states, the court concluded that "Congress
94. See id. See also Alaska v.Amariak, 941 P.2d at 156.
95. See id. at 164-65 (Shortell, J. pro tem, dissenting):
Thus, the MMPA cannot reasonably be interpreted to prevent the State from using its
general right to prevent trespass to exclude persons from Round Island ... If§ 1379(a)
is not so broad as to supersede the State's ability to enforce its general right to prevent
trespass, the MMPA would not unconstitutionally impinge on the State's right to
exclude others from its property.
96. See id.
97. See Brown Jug, Inc. v. International Bhd. ofTeamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen
& Helpers of America, Local 959, 688 P.2d 932, 938 (Alaska 1984).
98. See Alaska v. Amariak, 941 P.2d. at 164 (Shortell. J. pro tem, dissenting). ("The
State's power to enforce this right, of course, exists separately from the State's power to
prosecute violations of 5 AAC 99.066.").
99. See id.
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has not manifested in the MMPA in clear and definite language a desire to
displace the state's ability to ban certain activities in state wildlife
sanctuaries."'" A state wildlife sanctuary is, by definition, an area "tradi-
tionally regulated by the states." Moreover, the right to prevent trespass is
also a state-controlled activity.
In this case, Adam and Marie Arnariak would not be prosecuted under
the state laws and regulations if the MMPA were found to preempt the state
laws and regulations because they are Alaskan natives. Viewed in this light,
the issue would then be whether native Alaskan hunting is an area recog-
nized as "traditionally regulated by the states." The answer can be found in
a 1979 United States District Court case, People of Togiak v. United
States,'O' where Alaskan natives sought an order to declare invalid certain
regulations of the Department of Interior purporting to transfer to the State
of Alaska power to regulate the hunting of marine mammals. 2 The Alaskan
natives sought such invalidation arguing that the federal law preempted the
field to the exclusion of state authority.'03 More importantly, in making its
determination of matter, the court found that in an "analysis of the preemp-
tion issue, it is not without significance that the subject matter being
regulated is one which has traditionally been a federal responsibility."'" 14
That is, the court found that native taking is "an area where federal
responsibility and involvement are and always have been exceptionally
strong and direct."'"5 Given this formation, the court concluded that the
MMPA permitted Alaska natives to hunt non-depleted walrus as specified
under section 1371 of the Act. 10 6  However, in Arnariak, the Alaska
Supreme Court did not conclude that the MMPA permitted Alaskan natives
to hunt walrus. The court determined that state regulations concerning the
hunting of walrus in a state sanctuary were controlling, and hunting activities
were under traditional state control. Thus, the court failed to take into
account the "federal responsibility" involved when a native taking occurs.
The transfer of authority from the Secretary to the state is accomplished
through a process of "transferal of authority" under the MMPA. 07 In this
case, no transfer of authority occurred.108 It is conceivable that even if such
100. Id. at 157.
101. 470 F. Supp. 423 (D.D.C. 1979).
102. See id. at 424.
103. See id.
104. Id. at 428.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 423.
107. Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972, 16 U.S.C. § 1379 (1994).
108. See Alaska v. Arnariak, 893 P.2d 1273, 1275 (Alaska Ct. App. 1995).
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a transfer of authority had occurred, the issue of whether or not natives could
take marine mammals in this sanctuary would still be unresolved. However,
following Togiak, state authority would probably be supplanted by the
MMPA. The A rnariak court, in holding that a taking without just compensa-
tion would occur if the MMPA were construed as to prevent a state from
preventing entry to individuals, seems to be concluding that a cognizable
"land use regulation" could supplant federally mandated issues, including
federal control of native takings.
V. CONCLUSION
The decision of the court in Arnariak opens the door for state control
over federally legislated issues under the guise of "land use regulations." In
doing so, the court failed to recognize the potential for local abuse if a
nationally protective program is not followed. The purposes and goals of the
MMPA are designed to prevent such abuse. State control of marine mammal
taking regulations may arguably lead to such abuse. Thus, a federally
dominant structure of such regulations may prove more beneficial in
controlling the takings of marine mammals. Through the transfer of
authority to the state from the Secretary, a state may control the marine
mammals under its jurisdiction, but even this control is subject to the
purposes and goals of the MMPA. As this control may be deemed too
restrictive in certain circumstances, consideration of the ultimate purposes
and goals of the MMPA, combined with an opportunity for local input, may
provide for a more equitable determination of marine mammal questions.
